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Abstract: The paper analyses continuing vocational education and training policies in 
the UK in the period 1979-2010 with a focus on regulation and governance. It reviews 
Conservative and Labour party policies to ascertain their principal components and 
explore their evolution through time. More specifically, the paper reviews the 
paradoxical existence of three seemingly opposed accounts of recent dynamics in 
the management of continuing vocational training: one that sees it moving inexorably 
to the political right, one that emphasises the singularity of social-democratic policies 
and one that focuses on the difficulties of any movement, towards the political left or 
right. The paper concludes that while there has been a degree of convergence 
between right and left, differences remained in terms of their favoured institutional 
decision-making structures. However, Labour played a two-level game, which 
combined the establishment of new channels for dialogue and coordination with key 
stakeholders, with a limited scope for meaningful stakeholder input to policy. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
During the last decade or so, three major accounts of the relationship between neo-
liberalism and education and training have developed within the political science 
literature. The first account argues that neo-liberalism is increasingly embedded in 
public action in Continuing Vocational Training (CVT), and has become the only 
available way for governments to proceed (Crouch et al. 1999). A second account 
sees skills formation systems as being resilient to neo-liberal changes, because of 
entrenched national structures and established institutional complementarities that 
make movements difficult (Hall and Soskice 2001). A third account emphasises 
agency and the capacity of stakeholders to adopt social-democratic policies in 
education and training (Boix 1998; Iversen and Stephens 2008). A strand of the 
literature on political parties’ ideologies that reports persisting differences between 
left and right parties concurs with such argumentation (cf. Mair 2007 for a review). As 
explained in more detail below, this is also the view of the authors associated with 
the ‘Third-Way’ (Giddens 1998; Giddens and Diamond 2005), even though they claim 
to disavow ideology and reject the old division between left and right in favour of 
‘what works’.  
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Although the three strands aim to apply to skills formation systems as a whole, only 
Crouch et al. devote significant attention to CVT. Hall and Soskice chiefly look at 
formal education whereas Boix looks mostly, at least in his empirical analysis, at 
active labour market policies. The lack of coverage of CVT is striking. Continuing 
vocational education and training embodies one of the main dilemmas of 
contemporary politics (Crouch 1998): whilst it is viewed as a matter of public concern, 
its provision is not in the gift of the State alone. The State depends on private and 
community stakeholders for the demand for skills (Souto-Otero 2007). It thus 
provides a key area to test claims about the convergence towards neo-liberalism; if 
convergence cannot be found here, it is unlikely to be found in other areas of 
education, where government has greater independence.  
 
The paper reviews ‘New Right’ (1979-1997) and ‘New Labour1’ (1997-2010) policies 
in CVT to ascertain their principal components and explore their evolution through 
time. The paper has two main aims and one underlying contention. It aims to 
examine the extent to which the three political economy accounts outlined, which are 
often seen as exclusive, can in fact offer a coherent narrative of the policies adopted 
in the UK in the period 1979-2010 or whether they are, essentially, 
incommensurable. In order to do this, the paper complements political science 
literature, which tends to remain at an abstract level and focus on stylised facts, with 
a substantial body of educational research on this subject.  
 
Second, building on political science literature on stakeholder coordination and 
decision-making, the paper aims to moderate the mainstream interpretation of the 
education literature on CVT policy. There is a rich body of educational research in 
this area, and the reinterpretation is not radical, but it is significant. Educational 
                                                
1 In this paper ‘Labour’ and ‘New Labour’ are used interchangeably to refer to the Labour 
party in the period 1997-2010. 
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scholars have tended to use a broad brush in the analysis of CVT policies and have 
tended not to conceptualise sufficiently the qualitative changes in stakeholder 
engagement that occurred under Labour. The paper argues for a more nuanced 
analysis than a simple division between market and State models of decision-making 
in CVT. Finally, the underlying contention of the paper is that greater dialogue 
between educational and political science scholars would yield significant benefits to 
our understanding of CVT policy.  
 
Two clarifications are required. The paper does not attempt to identify an optimal 
model of CVT management. Second, although I refer to the UK in the paper, some of 
the arguments apply mainly to England (cf. Payne 2009). The structure of the paper 
is in five further sections: section two provides conceptual clarifications; section three 
reviews three theoretical accounts of the relationship between neo-liberalism and 
CVT; sections four and five present an analysis of the situation in the UK, 
respectively, during the Conservative and Labour governments; and section six 
presents my conclusions, which summarise the identified trends and discuss their 
causes with particular reference to globalisation, institutional and median voter 
arguments and Labour electoral strategies. 
2.0 Neo-liberalism in continuing vocational training 
 
Neo-liberalism is not simply an ethic in abstracto. The locus of its influence has 
become the ‘neoliberal State’. Political scientists and political sociologists 
characterise neo-liberalism by a set of properties such as the promotion of free 
competition, deregulation, privatization, internationalisation, consumer choice, tax 
reductions and the use of market proxies in the public sector (Cerny 2008; Jessop 
2002). Yet if something emerges from this work, this is the complex nature of the 
concept and the multiplicity of manifestations it can take (cf. Harvey 2005). By 
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contrast, most work on CVT policy, both from political science and education, takes 
neo-liberalism as a given, without dwelling too much on its properties. A good deal of 
it simply derives its notions of neo-liberalism from empirical observations, assuming 
that certain institutions are neoliberal just because they are found in certain 
countries, in particular the USA and the UK (Crouch 2005:441). In other words, the 
work on CVT policy tends to gloss over concept formation before discussion and 
quantification (Sartori 1970).  
 
Each of the three strands of literature outlined in the previous section devotes only 
marginal attention to the definition of CVT neoliberal policies, and general neo-liberal 
attributes such as ‘internationalization’ or the ‘lowering of direct taxes’ per se are not 
terribly relevant regarding CVT. Boix mainly concentrates on the identification of 
different investment patterns, to conclude that neo-liberal policies are characterised 
by low public investment in education and training. Hall and Soskice devote most of 
their attention to the linkages between CVT and other parts of the political economy, 
rather than dwelling on the internal characteristics of CVT systems, which are 
outlined only schematically. They underline the importance of the nature of the 
training offer in coordinated and liberal economies. Whereas skills provision is highly 
specialised in coordinated economies, it is generic in liberal economies. Crouch et 
al., on the other hand, use ‘neo-liberalism’ to denote particular types of investment, 
organization of public policy provision and distribution of decision-making powers. 
Neo-liberal policies try to restrict collective action through deregulation and to 
stimulate private investment in CVT by individuals and firms, in order to maintain low 
social spending levels (Crouch et al. 1999:4-5;128). Organisationally, neoliberal 
policies turn ‘departments of government into analogues of firms, acting in the market 
and therefore no longer possessing the capacity for collective decision-making’ and 
emphasise voluntary industry skills standards in training (Crouch et al. 1999:11;21). 
Governments operate through new public management techniques and targets. In 
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terms of the distribution of decision-making powers, a more ambiguous position 
emerges, as centralization is portrayed as a social-democratic and neoliberal trait. 
Neoliberals can employ centralisation as a first step to taking power away from 
corporatist institutions (King 1993), before implanting market-oriented approaches 
later, and also to indicate that interventionism outside welfare policies is accepted 
(Crouch et al. 1999:133).  
 
In spite of the sketchy treatment of neo-liberalism in CVT, two important aspects 
emerge. First, the different conceptual foci of these three accounts can help to 
explain the different conclusions to which these works arrive, although not fully. While 
there is a degree of incommensurability in the ways in which neo-liberalism is 
constructed in the three accounts, there are also commonalities in how they view 
neo-liberalism, regarding both its aims and its means. The overriding neo-liberal aim 
is that individuals and employers become the main decision-makers in CVT. They 
should have responsibility for CVT regulation and financing, as a means to achieve 
those aims. In terms of regulation, the freedom of choice of employers and 
individuals should be maximised, whereas the State and trade unions (TU) should 
have a marginal role. In terms of financing, those who make training decisions and 
benefit from them (individuals and employers according to neo-liberal accounts) 
should pay for CVT. This seems to be the composition of the ‘genus’ of the concept, 
shared by the three accounts, which then add other properties to the concept to 
create their particular species of neo-liberalism.  
 
This genus is the particular starting point for this article. It is used  to explore the 
comparative advantages, disadvantages, complementarities and incompatibilities of 
the three accounts exposed. The analysis concentrates on regulation patterns given 
existing limitations in panel data on public investment on CVT in the UK. The paper 
refers to ‘policy trajectories’ (Ball 1993), and reviews policy texts, the contested 
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nature of policy actions and the role of different stakeholders in the policy process. In 
my own assessment I shall make use of an analytical frame on decision-making 
structures provided by the political science literature that explores degrees of 
coordination and corporatism in advanced industrialised countries. While the location 
of decision-making powers is vital in the definitions of neo-liberalism in CVT reviewed 
above, the three accounts tend to resort to dichotomous views of State and social 
partner involvement, focusing only on two extremes of a much richer continuum (cf. 
sections 4 and 5 below). While this has, undoubtedly, analytical advantages, in 
particular in comparative research of the type undertaken by Hall and Soskice, Boix 
and Crouch et al., it also has shortcomings when trying to explain within-country 
differences through time – as this paper attempts - or indeed the positions in 
countries that lie between the “model” cases, toward which comparative work tends 
to gravitate (UK, USA, Germany).  
 
Building on the work of Hollingsworth et al. (1994) I distinguish four types of 
coordination in decision-making: first, hierarchies of capitalist enterprises, where the 
State only stands as an enforcer of pro-market rules; second, community networks 
characterised by stakeholder information sharing for decision-making, even if a 
common culture between different stakeholders has not been created and for whose 
success an effective facilitating State or non-State association is important; third, 
formal associations of economic actors, normally corporatist institutions; and fourth, 
direct government action. Using this typology as a reference point for the empirical 
analysis, in the following sections I check the extent to which neo-liberalism –
associated with the first type of coordination - has become pervasive in the 
governance of CVT in the UK.  
 
While coordination in decision-making is important, a second aspect to consider is 
the rationale of government and issues of power to enforce. Throughout, I refer to 
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“governance” rather than governmentality. The governmentality approach is not 
based on a transfer of power (as govenance is), but a different logic of government 
whereby civil society ceases to be a passive object of government to become both an 
object and a subject of government (Foucault 2003). Institutionalised forms of 
political authority become more de-centralised and diffused, with the State playing a 
strategic but not necessarily dominant role (Sendin and Newmann 2006). This paper 
argues that while Labour claimed to move towards a “governmentality” approach to 
CVT management, it fell short of this. Labour’s partnership approaches, at least 
formally “invited”, rather than obliged, the adoption of certain conducts. It deployed 
new possibilities of agency and new relations between individual agency, 
representative organisations and political structures. ‘‘Offering’’ individuals and 
collectivities active involvement to resolve the kind of issues hitherto held to be the 
responsibility of authorized governmental agencies resulted in a new form of 
responsibilisation (Sendin and Newmann 2006). However, Labour did not provide 
stakeholders with the means to fulfil their responsibilities, making the real outcomes 
of stakeholder involvement limited. Moreover, the Labour government continued to 
exercise a tight direction on policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 Neo-liberalism and continuing vocational training 
trajectories: three accounts 
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This section reviews in more detail the three accounts of the relationship between 
neo-liberalism and CVT I have outlined. The first account sees neo-liberalism on the 
ascent, as private agencies become more demanding and mobile and less willing to 
accept interventions and mandates from public bodies (Crouch et al. 1999). Whilst 
public regulation would seem increasingly justifiable to correct market failures in CVT 
given its tighter than ever relation to national economic competitiveness and the 
reduction of ‘new social risks’ such as long-term unemployment (Taylor-Gooby 
2004), governments of left and right are seen as increasingly unable to enact 
regulatory reforms due to lack of will and/or credibility to intervene (Glyn 2006). It is 
not that governments are incapable of action in CVT; they have the legal and fiscal 
instruments for action, but find it increasingly difficult to make use of these 
instruments (Ohmae 2005). The internationalization of capital markets causes a 
reduction in the macroeconomic steering capacities of governments (Scharpf 2000); 
growing levels of transnational investment and competition from low-wage countries 
strengthen the structural power of capital and undermine the capacity of 
governments to pursue distinct social policies (Gough and Farnsworth 2000).  
 
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) literature, by contrast, emphasises continuity in the 
structuring of national economies and persisting differences in countries’ strategies 
for international competition and survival. VoC asserts that ‘institutional 
complementarities’ sustain differences that ‘lock in’ educational systems to particular 
paths: ‘a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy should tend to 
develop complementarity practices in other spheres as well’ (Hall and Soskice 
2001:12). Configurations of complementary institutions are subject to positive 
feedback loops, whereby the interdependent web of an institutional matrix produces 
increasing returns (Pierson 2000). The literature on VoC thus argues that differences 
between countries will continue due to their initial institutional configurations. VoC 
differentiates between liberal market and coordinated market economies. 
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Coordinated economies make use of specialised skills to compete in highly 
customised product markets and rely on education and training systems that can 
provide that type of skill. By contrast, liberal economies have fluid labour markets, 
which encourage individuals to acquire general skills so that they can easily change 
jobs. Companies and countries look for their comparative advantages, thus avoiding 
trends of convergence. Governments face similar external pressures, but also 
internal constraints and opportunities to deal with those (Howell 2003). Instead of 
neoliberal retrenchment across the board we could expect path dependency that 
makes it difficult to change CVT systems given the institutional context in which they 
are embedded. Recent works by Crouch et al. (2005) and Hall and Thelen (2009) 
have tried to better accommodate notions of institutional change, power and agency 
within the VoC approach, by looking at coalitional analyses that acknowledge the 
constraints put on actors by existing institutions. In fact, in this more recent 
specification, it is coalitions that take the driving seat in explaining institutions. 
However, in order to preserve a degree of coherence with previous VoC work, Hall 
and Thelen (2009) maintain that distinct national trajectories have so far been 
maintained.  
 
Empirical analyses by Boix (1998) and Iversen and Stephens (2008) add to this 
complexity by arguing that political parties have more than a marginal role in 
determining economic and ‘human capital’ formation policies. Boix reviews the 
alternative strategies of left and right wing parties in the pursuit of economic growth. 
Left-wing governments impose higher tax rates to fund heavy spending in 
infrastructure and human capital formation, to raise the productivity factors and the 
competitiveness of the economy, as well as equality. Right-wing governments rely on 
private agents to stimulate economic growth, believing that low taxes lead to greater 
private savings, which result in greater investment to raise competitiveness and 
standards of living. Although Boix concedes that globalisation and the organisation of 
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the domestic political economy place limits on the capacity of parties to affect 
demand-side Keynesian macroeconomic policies, he contends that supply-side 
policies are different. Neither the claim that the structure of the labour market nor the 
claim that globalisation are decreasing the choices for supply-side measures is 
warranted. Boix takes on the argument that a centralised organisation of the labour 
movement is crucial for the implementation of left supply-side policies by arguing that 
while labour cooperation is required to ensure the success of expansionary 
macroeconomic policies and full employment without accelerating inflation, public 
investment policies can be developed without the support of unions through balanced 
monetary and fiscal policies. On the other hand, he expects that threat of ‘capital exit’ 
does not affect supply side policies, since these can be designed to attract capital 
through the boosting of productivity and competitiveness (see also Swank 2002). 
Public supply side policies thus can be market-friendly and this is, for Boix, precisely 
the point of social-democracy. Some authors have gone even further and predicted 
not only that social-democratic strategies continue to be viable, but also that liberal 
countries will face greater difficulties than ‘social-democratic corporatist’ countries in 
a globalised economy, because they in fact depend on capital taxes more heavily 
(Hays 2003). 
 
The Third Way largely adheres to this third account. For Giddens, a distinctive 
element of the Third Way as part of a new ‘social investment state’ is investment in 
human capital rather than the provision of material resources – the tenet of the ‘old 
welfare state’ - which is viewed as incompatible with a competitive economy. 
Education thus became ‘the new mantra for social-democratic politicians’ (Giddens 
1998:109) a tool, first, for economic development and, second, for social inclusion, 
understood as inclusion in the labour market. It is also a tool for a New 
Egalitarianism, based not on the ‘redistribution of opportunity’ (Giddens and Diamond 
2005) that enables both self-realisation and the creation of wealth in the knowledge 
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economies. Giddens is not in favour of low taxes and low public investment, only 
lower investment in the ‘old welfare state’ functions to be redirected to different 
areas. New Labour aimed at education and training reform, following theories of 
endogenous growth and adopting human capital development as a panacea enabling 
the UK to compete in the global economy (Brown et al. 2011; Leitch 2006).  
 
I move on to examine these theories through an analysis of the case of the UK in 
sections four and five. The examination builds on the detail provided by the education 
literature, and focuses on both decision-making instances and regulation in CVT, 
factors that the examination of the three accounts has identified as being at the core 
of the definition of neo-liberalism. 
4.0 The Conservative Government (1979-1997) 
Before the Conservatives gained government in the late 1970s, the UK CVT system 
was dominated by Industrial Training Boards (ITB) that administered a general 
training levy, and the Manpower Service Commission (MSC), a quasi-State 
department with inputs from both employers and unions, that was responsible for the 
development of a central training policy and for administering the funds of ITBs. 
Within this tripartite system of governance of CVT, employers, trade unions and 
government played a fairly equal role (King 1993). Immediately after its election in 
1979, Thatcher’s government did not pay great attention to educational issues. 
However, they gradually acquired a higher profile. Action in this area could show to 
the electorate that the Conservative government was acting to address social 
inequalities (Pierson 1996), and could make clear the benefits of extending the free-
market model into social policy. During the 1980s the UK's tripartite system was 
dismantled and the existing training levy was abolished (Stevens 1999), conforming 
to the preferred deregulatory approaches expected from neoliberal policies.  
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In the early 1980s, most ITBs were transformed into voluntary employer-led 
organizations: Non-Statutory Training Organisations (later rebranded as ITOs, 
Industry Training Organisations), which were poorly resourced and devoid of the 
power to raise levies. TU involvement was by invitation only. They were maintained 
through voluntary employer fees and their functions were limited to the provision of 
information and employer exhortation to train more (Payne 2008). Following a 
second major reform in the late 1980s, with the creation of Training and Enterprise 
Councils (TECs), the remaining ITBs became non-statutory training organizations2. 
The Conservatives argued that ITBs had not addressed the under-provision of 
training in companies and had only been successful in encouraging ‘outdated’ 
apprenticeship training (Greenhalgh 1999).  
 
TECs soon assumed the responsibilities of the MSC, after successive electoral 
successes gave the Conservatives confidence to end the tripartite system, and the 
economic problems faced by the UK shifted the interests of employers and TU away 
from training to more pressing issues (King 1993). Several TUs, devoid of the power 
they had under the previous system, refused to work with TECs although the majority 
of unions desired to collaborate with them, to assume at least some role in policy 
formulation and delivery. TECs, however, became deliverers of government policy, 
and focused their activities on the increasing numbers of unemployed people, 
decreasing their engagement in further workforce development (Robinson 1996). 
TUs became, effectively, out of the skills game.  
 
The Conservatives introduced centrally defined, non-binding standards such as 
‘Investors in People’ (IiP) and the national targets for adult learning. IiP, a national 
standard of good practice for training and development, started in the early 1990s as 
                                                
2 The sole exception was the Engineering and Construction Industry Training Board that retained its 
power to raise a training levy from member companies. 
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a central feature of the Conservative’s training policy (Hoque et al. 2005). It required 
employers to identify skills gaps in their own organization and device training plans to 
improve their performance. Organisations meeting the assessment criteria are 
rewarded with recognition by the lead body – IiP UK (Hoque 2003). Even though the 
standard survives – making it a rare case as a long-standing initiative in CVT in the 
UK - the scheme often recognises procedures that existed for years without 
encouraging new training (Bell et al. 2001). Similarly, the Conservatives’ targets for 
adult learning, introduced in the early 1990s, were not accompanied by funding to 
stimulate their achievement. The only methods employed were exhortation of 
individual workers and employers, which proved insufficient.  
 
Finally, central government removed Further Education (FE) Colleges – which have a 
significant role in CVT - from local authority control, and used its increased role in FE 
college financing to implement significant budget cuts (Simmons 2009). By the mid-
1990s the UK’s CVT system had been profoundly transformed towards a neoliberal 
system. The system, after the withdrawal of control from TU and local authorities, 
relied on defined market hierarchies for its operation, with a degree of central 
government directions. The tripartite system no longer existed and social partnership 
approaches in the design and governance of CVT had been abandoned (Keep 
2006a). Trade unions became much weaker and were regularly excluded from 
policy-making in CVT (Goodwin et al. 1999). Their membership decreased 
significantly, from their peak in 1979 to cover less than a third of UK employees, 
mainly employed by the public sector. Collective bargaining, moreover, had for a long 
time excluded the statutory right to negotiate on learning issues (Clough 2011). 
Coordination took place on an ad-hoc basis, depending merely on the will of firms, 
who also decided whether to subscribe to government-set national standards. The 
UK was locked in a ‘low-skills equilibrium’ (Finegold and Soskice 1988) in which 
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businesses did not invest in workforce development, as other strategies for profit 
maximisation continued to deliver short-term results (Keep and Mayhew 1998). 
5.0 The ‘New Labour' Government (1997-2010)  
 
Much of the educational literature sees the Labour government period from 1997 as 
a continuation of Conservative policy, and essentially neo-liberal (Power and Whitty 
1999; Coffield, 1999a, 1999b; Wood 1999; Lloyd and Payne 2007; Payne 2009). 
After reviewing New Labour policy, Lloyd and Payne (2007:64) appropriately 
conclude that while giving unions a higher profile in CVT than they did during the 
Conservative years the changes implemented fall short of what might be reasonably 
described as (tripartite) social partnership. Yet, what is it? It is one thing to suggest 
that Labour policy was not based on social partnership, and a different thing to 
suggest that Labour continued the Conservatives’ neoliberal CVT policy. I argue that 
Labour moved towards community networks as platforms for decision-making. The 
analysis reviews the intended regeneration of employer organisations and TUs and 
the role given to individuals. 
 
For community networks to operate in CVT representation of employers and workers 
needed to take place and stronger intermediary organisations had to be regenerated 
or created after their dismantling in the 1980s and 1990s. National Training 
Organisations (NTOs) replaced the Conservative ITOs in the late 1990s as 
employers’ representatives on training issues, but they suffered credibility problems 
(Payne 2008). Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) replaced NTOs in the early 2000s. 
SSCs had a more plural composition and in some respects were reminiscent of the 
type of networks seen in coordinated market economies (Martin and Knudsen 2007). 
They had the potential to provide a more representative employer voice (Keep 
2006b). While SSCs led to greater coordination, their potential as associations of 
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economic actors should not be exaggerated: they were government licensed and 
funded, followed governments’ agenda and targets and were not widely recognised 
by employers (Humphries 2006).  
 
In the late 1990s, as the economy improved, TUs turned to training issues again, 
under their Bargaining for Skills programme. As part of this, the Trade Unions 
Congress (TUC) pledged support for the National Targets for Education and Training, 
which Labour adopted to make Britain competitive internationally. Labour’s 
‘partnership’ approach with TUs aimed to avoid a return to a confrontational system 
of industrial relations, and was strongly supported by some trade unionists 
themselves. TU became ‘brokers’ to encourage learning. They were given 
representation, albeit limited, on most of the VET institutions created by Labour, such 
as SSCs, the LSC and the National Skills Alliance (Lloyd and Payne 2007). While the 
practical value of the partnerships beyond exhortation has been questioned 
(Charlwood 2004), Labour used some mechanisms to try to support the role of TUs 
on CVT issues, such as the statutory recognition of Union Learning Representatives 
and the Union Learning Fund.  
 
Union learning representatives (ULR) provide advice, guidance and support to 
colleagues in activities related to learning and bargain with employers on training 
issues. They became important in the development of working relationships between 
capital and labour to facilitate employee learning (Vind et al. 2004). This did not 
impose statutory obligations on employers, such as the obligation to give time-off for 
training (Wellis et al. 2005). Yet, moving to a more consensual approach, ULRs 
received statutory backing. This reversed the tendency of the two previous decades 
of ‘government hostility and antipathy’ towards TUs on skills development issues 
(Wellis et al. 2005:283-284). Complementarily, a Union Learning Fund (ULF) was 
created in the late 1990s that made modest amounts of money available to TUs for 
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development work with employers or training providers, a scheme that has been 
reasonably successful to date (Taylor 2005). Unions also played a role in the delivery 
of initiatives with lower organizational bearing but considered Labour flagships, such 
as University for Industry (UfI) and the extinct Individual Learning Accounts (ILAs) – 
cf. below in this section.3 They became more significant stakeholders within the 
government agenda for post-16 learning (Forrester and Payne 2000).  
 
Unions also supported Labour in its reshaping and centralization of CVT through the 
creation of the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) in 2000, a single non-departmental 
public body responsible for the whole range of publicly-funded post-16 education and 
training – except higher education. Although the LSC could not be conceived as a 
return to the tripartite system (Coffield 2000) it was much more plural than the TECs 
(Ramsdem et al. 2004). At least in its early years the LSC adopted a planned and 
unified approach, which reflected the stronger emphasis New Labour placed on 
learning and skills compared to the Conservatives (Steer et al. 2007), although it later 
moved towards a more top-down market-oriented model of governance. From 2005 
the emphasis on central direction and micro-management from the Ministry, target 
setting and provider competition accentuated, with the aim of creating a system that 
was more ‘responsive’ to the needs of individuals and employers (Hodgson et al. 
2008). In 2010, the LSC was substituted by the Young People’s Learning Agency 
and the Skills Funding Agency (SFA) to more closely meet the needs of employers 
and employees as defined by government (Avis 2009). However, as Hogdson et al. 
(2008) have argued, without a wider social partnership framework and measures 
such as sectors’ levies or tax concessions to employers, there will always be limits to 
                                                
3 In July 2010, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills published: “Skills for 
Sustainable Growth” a consultation on the future direction of skills policy. This indicates that 
BIS were considering the creation of Lifelong Learning Accounts (LLAs), which every adult 
could use when beginning any new learning. John Hayes’ announced forthcoming 
consultations on this issue in a speech at Warwickshire College on June 15th 2011. 
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how much the reform of policy structures could help to meet Labour’s targets for 
workforce development. 
 
While TUs have regularly called for a new ‘post-voluntary’ or statutory framework 
over training they have been accommodating and willing to collaborate with Labour in 
partnership approaches, which is a result of TUs’ current high levels of dependence 
on government funding. Towards the end of the Labour period in office criticisms had 
turned towards to unions themselves, for their insufficient challenge of Labour 
assumptions regarding training and for not advancing a broader agenda to raise the 
demand for skills (Shelley 2008; Lloyd and Payne 2007). Instead, they have come to 
support government in their delivery of policies that conform to employers’ 
predilections (McIlroy 2008). While the existence of a new institutional setting 
provided TUs with greater voice than in the previous period their weakness after 
Thatcher meant that they had limited scope for choice or influence. 
 
Labour also sought a new contract with individuals based on the redefinition of their 
rights and responsibilities, based on its particular view of education and training and 
its relationship to the global economy. According to New Labour, the unbridled 
individualism and neo-liberalism of the Conservatives focused on individual rights, 
but not responsibilities, which is fundamentally flawed. Providing individuals with 
opportunities places obligations on them to make use of these (Prabhakar 2002). On 
the other hand New Labour substituted ‘old Labour’s’ equality discourse by a social 
inclusion discourse, where exclusion is seen as non-participation in the labour 
market, and is associated with individual skill deficiencies or cultural deficits and self-
government. The decision-making power was thus also directed towards the 
‘individual’, accountable towards the community, as represented by the State. Up-
skilling became a civic duty. As long as skills are defined as the only key to 
employment and individuals are held responsible for the development of their skills, 
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unemployment becomes their fault. The one-sided emphasis on the supply side of 
the economy and skills development (ignoring the demand side) has been one of the 
main criticisms faced by New Labour skills policy (Keep 2006a). While the availability 
of skilled labour is one aspect that motivates businesses to locate, other factors such 
as its cost are important too, in particular as emerging economies upskill too (Brown 
et al. 2011). This makes the supply-side measures that New Labour defended less 
prone to guarantee economic success on their own. As Coffield (1999) notes, Labour 
initiatives such as UfI and ILAs transferred the responsibility for remaining 
‘employable’ onto individuals, who do not have the power to remove the structural 
barriers which prevent them from learning or obtaining employment. New Labour 
thus came to ‘blame the victim’.  
 
In its last stages in government, Labour’s move towards greater reliance on employer 
and employee community networks was accompanied by a move towards a ‘new 
localism’, in which the State placed a renewed emphasis on the local level to 
increase accountability and address political centralism and ‘democratic deficit’ 
through the recognition of user voice in the shaping of public services (Newman and 
Clarke 2009). Engagement under ‘new localism’ was somewhat superficial, as 
discussions took place in reference to goals predetermined centrally by government. 
However, it involved new forms of accountability, questioning and on-going 
exchanges between public service providers and the relevant public (Avis 2009). This 
points toward a dialogic engagement of constituents or stakeholders (Glesson et al. 
2005). While ‘new localism’ transcended pure market narratives and consumerist 
concerns but, like other Labour initiatives, it also embedded pluralist assumptions of 
rationality and consensual policy-making, at the expense of contestation. 
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6.0 Conclusions 
This paper has outlined recent theoretical debates in relation to the constraints faced 
by governments to implement other than neoliberal policies in CVT, an area which 
provides particular challenges for government intervention given the existence of 
vested interest of other stakeholders and the absence of direct governmental control. 
Three strands in the literature highlight, respectively, an almost structural 
impossibility for government action except towards neoliberal positions; the 
possibilities of agency and resulting differences between conservative and social-
democratic parties in the management of the supply side of the economy (the 
account with which the Third Way is more attuned), and the difficulties of any change 
process due to institutional complementarity. They have been often taken as 
incompatible views. 
 
The first aim of the paper was to examine the extent to which these accounts are 
mutually exclusive or can offer a complementary view on long-term trends in the 
adoption of neo-liberalism in the UK. While part of the explanation of the different 
findings of the three accounts resides on the somewhat different definitions of neo-
liberalism they use, it is the difference in their explananda that is most important. 
Much of the political partisanship literature assumes that the right-left axis (and the 
preferences of those on either side) is a constant, by contrast to the neo-liberalism 
literature, which highlights that all political elites (right and left) have moved in a 
market-friendly direction. The existence of these different accounts should not be 
seen, then, as paradoxical contrary to what is commonly assumed. The paper has 
indeed shown, taking a ‘core’ definition of neo-liberalism derived from the three 
theoretical accounts, a narrowing in the differences between Labour and 
Conservative parties’ management of CVT issues, and that this has been due to a 
movement of Labour to the right, even though differences do still persist. This is 
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consistent with studies that have questioned the unidirectional nature of development 
towards neo-liberalism in countries such as Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal (see 
Royo 2007). Together, these analyses show that at least some degree of local 
interpretations of global paradigms is possible (Ball 1999). The neoliberal 
convergence and the partisanship literature, in fact, could be seen to offer only partial 
explanations of current trends in CVT if taken separately. This is something that the 
educational literature in particular needs to consider more carefully, as it has 
overwhelmingly tended to emphasise Labour’s continuation of Conservative’s CVT 
policy. In this regard, more research is needed that uses insights from these two 
strands of the literature in conjunction. This would help to more clearly identify the 
point from which current developments would lead the left to lose its identity, and 
how the left can create new narratives to expand its political room for manoeuvre, in 
particular as the Conservative Party tries to further squeeze the centre with its recent 
turn to “compassionate conservatism” (Olasky 2000).  
 
The VoC approach, on the other hand, needs to be overhauled to incorporate more 
dynamic elements and wider decision-making models. Although VoC concedes that 
other actors than firms are important, it assumes that political economy institutions 
cannot be sustained for a long period of time without the support of at least some 
segments of capital. One problem to judge these claims against the developments 
outlined in this article is that what a ‘long period of time’ may be is not specified, so it 
is not possible to ascertain whether the changes described under Labour qualify 
within that category. A second problem is that in practice it is difficult to find any 
institutions that do not receive support from ‘at least some segments of capital’, since 
the interest of capital are not homogeneous. This study shows how political changes 
are of crucial importance in the understanding of institutional change in CVT and how 
stakeholders’ interests can be reshaped by the regulatory framework within which 
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they operate – which is itself dependent, ultimately, on political decisions and 
evolving social values.  
 
The analysis has also revealed the limitations of dualist analyses (social partnership/ 
market hierarchies) such as those of the VoC and political partisanship literature, 
which tend to ignore that other forms of engagement are possible. Smith and Smith 
(2007) see Labour policy as an attempt to increase government and decrease social 
partner power in a direct continuation of the Conservative’s policy of ‘free economy 
and strong State’ (Gamble 1994). As I have shown, Labour did promote greater 
collaboration and cooperation around shared needs. My argument has been that 
under Labour the UK moved from a market system (as developed by the 
Conservative governments) towards other forms of policy-making, based on 
community networks. This was certainly not enough to create strong social 
partnership arrangements of the German and Scandinavian type, and this has been 
the tenet of the education literature (Keep 2009; Coffield et al. 2008). But the creation 
of community networks nevertheless required change in the political economy of 
skills formation in the UK, and greater engagement with TUs than in the Conservative 
period. The effectiveness of these embryonic forms of coordination is subject to 
debate. They were often used in a trivialised way, given that Labour did not 
regenerate the power of unions, badly hurt after the Conservative years, and given 
TU’s reliance on government funding they had limited the scope of real dialogue to 
take place. This, in turn, also meant that unions could play a limited role in supporting 
government in the implementation of their policies. In short, while Labour CVT policy 
had a more regulative and plural outlook than Conservatives’ policy, real bases for 
plurality and debate were lacking. New Labour mainly used the regeneration of 
community networks as a self-legitimising tool, a useful form rather than a useful 
resource for policy-making. 
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This raises questions as to the nature of the changes enacted. Compared to the 
Conservatives, Labour altered the policy process more than policy outcomes. Why 
was this the case? New Labour, in this aspect paradoxically close to VoC instead of 
partisan arguments to which it generally subscribes, underlined institutional 
constraints. Blair famously declared, in 1999, to bear the scars on his back after two 
years in government attempting welfare reform. Yet agents can behave differently 
within set institutional environments (Souto-Otero 2011a), and thus it is here that is 
important to consider the role of interests and also recognise the importance of ideas, 
to elaborate more nuanced explanations. While political parties exist to win elections, 
New Labour put electoral marketing at its core. It obsessively tried to appeal to right 
voters to win elections. In this respect Labour played a ‘two-level game’ whereby the 
institutional architecture it created and the policies it adopted appealed to diverse 
constituencies (left and right respectively). While the inclusion of Unions contributed 
to labour appeasement, the content of Labour policy produced “capital appeasement” 
(Hay 1997) at a time when “credibility in the market” and “responsible hard choices” 
became the overriding aims, and “median voters” (Jackman 1975), who decide 
election results, had moved to right (Souto-Otero 2011b). Thus, Labour promoted 
networks not only for reasons of political correctness, efficacy, or the belief that ‘all 
three key areas of power’ (government, the economy and civil society) need to be 
constrained in the interest of social justice (Giddens 1998). It was also because 
formal partnerships deflected government responsibility (Hillman 1997) and enabled 
blame-sharing, in an area where progress had been strikingly difficult to achieve, and 
enabled Labour to appeal to a wider electoral base, by trying to reconcile 
oppositional terms that divided the left and right on VET issues (labour/capital; 
public/private). In the words of Giddens (2000:152), stakeholder capitalism and its 
“old divisions” were “closed” and “clientelist”; it was not “quick enough on its feet to 
respond to the world in which we find ourselves”. This opens new questions on how 
the Conservatives and associated epistemic communities made the neo-liberal story 
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and institutional setting “the” authoritative response to the breakdown of the post-war 
compromise, in spite of its evident shortcomings. Such discussions should not forget 
the role of the British public who, at least initially, supported a good deal of New 
Labour ‘welfare reform’ (Ross 2000). We have seen that the constraints faced by 
governments do not have to lead to inactivity nor to extreme path-dependency. In the 
period analysed, the UK system has undergone a complete overhaul and has moved 
in, to say the least, incoherent directions. 
 25 
Bibliography 
 
Avis, J. (2009) ‘Further education in England: the new localism, systems theory and 
governance’ Journal of Education Policy, vol.24(5), pp. 633-648. 
 
Ball, S. (1999) “Labour, learning and the economy: a ‘policy sociology’ perspective” 
Cambridge Journal of Education, vol.29(2), pp. 195-206.  
- (1993) ‘What is policy? Texts, trajectories and toolboxes’ Discourse, vol.13(2), pp. 
10-17. 
 
Bell, E., Taylor, S. and Thorpe, R. (2001) ‘Investors in People and the 
standardisation of knowledge in personnel management’. Management Learning, vol. 
32, pp. 201–19. 
 
Boix, C. (1998) Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social 
Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Bradford, N. (2002) ‘Renewing Social Democracy? Beyond the Third Way‘ Studies in 
Political Economy, vol.67, pp. 145-161. 
 
Brown, P., Lauder, H. and Ashton, D. (2010) The global auction, New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Calveley, M., Healy, G., Shelley, S., Stirling, J. and Wray, D. (2003) ‘Union Learning 
Representatives – a Force for Renewal or “Partnership”?’ University of Hertfordshire 
Business School Working Paper, No.10. 
 
Cerny, P. G. (2008) ‘Embedding neoliberalism: the evolution of a hegemonic 
paradigm’ The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy, vol.2(1), pp.1-46. 
 
Charlwood, A. (2004) ‘The new generation of Trade Union leaders and prospects for 
union revitalisation’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 42(2), pp. 379-397. 
 
Claydon, T. and Green, F. (1994) ‘Can trade unions improve training in Britain?’ 
Personnel Review, vol.23(1), pp. 37-51. 
 
Clough, B. (2011) ‘From spearholders to stakeholders: the emerging role of Unions in 
the UK learning and skills system’ in Cooney, R. and Stuart, M. (eds.) Trade unions 
and workplace training: international perspectives. London, Routledge. 
 
Coffield F. (1999a) Breaking the consensus: lifelong learning as social control 
Inaugural Lecture, University of Newcastle 
- (1999b) Why is the beer always stronger up north? Studies of Lifelong 
Learning in Europe, Bristol: University of Bristol Policy Press. 
- (2000) ‘Lifelong Learning as a lever on structural change? Evaluation of the 
white paper: Learning to succeed: a new framework for post-16 learning’ Journal of 
Education Policy, vol.15, no. 2, pp. 237-246. 
 
Coffield, F., Edward, S., Finlay, I., Hodgson, A., Steer, R. and Spours, K. (2008) 
Improving learning, skills and inclusion: the impact of policy. London, Routledge 
Falmer. 
 
Crouch, C. (2005) ‘Models of capitalism’ New Political Economy, vol.10(4), pp. 439-
456. 
 26 
- (1998) ‘Public Policy in a private arena: the case of vocational education and 
training’ Estudio/Working Papers CEACS Fundación Juan March 1998/121 June 
1998. 
 
Crouch, C., Finegold, D. and Sako, M. (1999) Are skills the answer? The political 
economy of skills creation in advanced industrialised countries, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Crouch, C., Streek, W., Boyer, R., Amable, B., Hall, P. A. and Jackson, G. (2005) 
‘Dialogue on “institutional complementarity and political economy”’ Socio-Economic 
Review, vol. 3 no. 2, pp. 359-382. 
 
Finegold, D. and Soskice, D. (1988) ‘The failure of training in Britain: analysis and 
prescription’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol.4(3), pp. 21-53.  
 
Forrester, K. and Payne, J. (2000) 'Trade union modernisation and lifelong learning', 
Research in Post- Compulsory Education, vol.5(2), pp.153 — 171. 
 
Foucault, M. (2003) ‘‘Society Must Be Defended,’’ Lectures Given at the College de 
France 1975–1976. New York: Picador Press. 
 
Gamble, A. (1994) The free economy and the strong State: the politics of 
Thatcherism. London, Palgrave, McMillan. 
 
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
- (2000) The Third Way and its critics. London, Polity Press. 
 
Giddens, A. and Diamond, P. (eds.) (2005) The New Egalitarianism. Cambridge, 
Polity Press. 
 
Glyn, A. (2006) Capitalism Unleashed, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Goodwin, J., Hills, K. and Ashton, D. (1999) ‘Training and development in the UK’ 
International Journal of Training and Development, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 167-179. 
 
Gough, I. and Farnsworth, K. (2000) ‘The Enhanced Structural Power of Capital: A 
Review and Assessment’, in I. Gough (ed.) Global Capital, Human Needs and Social 
Policies: Selected Essays 1994–99. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Greenhalgh, Ch, (1999) ‘Adult vocational training and government policy in France 
and Britain’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol.15, no. 1, pp. 97-113. 
 
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (eds.) (2001) Varieties of capitalism: the institutional 
foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hall, P. A. and Thelen, K. (2009) ‘Institutional change in varieties of capitalism’ Socio-
economic Review, vol. 7, pp. 7-34 
 
Harvey, D. (2005) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Hay, C. (1997) “Anticipating accommodations, accommodating anticipations: the 
appeasement of capital in the ‘modernization’ of the British Labour Party 1982-1992” 
Politics and Society, vol.25(2), 234-256. 
 
 27 
Hays, J. (2003) ‘Globalization and capital taxation in consensus and majoritarian 
democracies’ World Politics, vol.56(1), pp. 79-113. 
 
Hillman, J. (1997) University for Industry: Creating a National Learning Network. 
London: Institute for Public Policy 
Research. 
 
Hodgson, A., Spours, K. and Steer, R. (2008) 'All change for the learning and skills 
sector?' Journal of Education and Work, vol. 21(2),pp. 115 — 131. 
 
Hollingsworth, J. R., Schmitter, P. and Streek, W. (eds.) (1994) Governing capitalist 
economies. Performance and control of economic sectors. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Hoque, K. (2003). ‘All in all, it’s just another plaque on the wall: the incidence and 
impact of the Investors in People Standard’. Journal of Management Studies, 40: 
543–71. 
 
Hoque, K., Taylor, S. and Bell, E. (2005) ‘Investors in people: market-led voluntarism 
in vocational education and training’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 43(1), 
pp. 135-153. 
 
Howell, C. (2003) Varieties of capitalism: and then there was one? Comparative 
Politics, vol. 36(1), pp. 103-124. 
 
Humphries, C. (2006) ‘Skills in a global economy: Ten proposals for a UK skills 
policy’ Local Economy, vol. 21(3), pp. 241-248. 
 
Hyland, T. (2002) ‘Third Way values and post-school education policy’ Journal of 
Education Policy, vol.17(2), pp. 245-258. 
 
Iversen, T. and Stephens, J. D. (2008) ‘Partisan politics, the Welfare State and three 
worlds of human capital formation’ Comparative Political Studies, vol. 41,(4/5), pp. 
600-637. 
 
Jackman, R. W. (1975) Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis. New 
York: Wiley. 
 
Jessop, B. (2002) ‘Liberalism, neoliberalism and urban governance: a state 
theoretical perspective’ Antipode, vol.34(3), pp. 452-472. 
 
Keep, E. (2009) ‘The limits of the possible: shaping the learning and skills landscape 
through a shared policy narrative’ SKOPE Research Paper, No. 86, June 2009. 
-(2006a) ‘State control of the English education and training system –playing with the 
biggest train set in the world’ Journal of Vocational Education and Training, vol. 
58(1), pp. 47-64. 
-(2006b) ‘Market failure in skills’ SSDA Catalyst, Number1. 
 
Keep, E. and Mayhew, E. (1998) Was Ratner Right? Product market and competitive 
strategies and their links with skills and knowledge. London, Employment Policy 
Institute. 
 
King, D. (1993) ‘The Conservatives and Training Policy 1979-1992: From a tripartite 
to a Neoliberal regime’ Political Studies, XLI, 214-235. 
 
 28 
Labour Party (1997) Electoral Manifesto. London, Labour Party. 
 
Leitch, S. (2006) Prosperity for all in the global economy –world class skills. London: 
HMSO. 
 
Lloyd, C. (2008)'Recruiting for fitness: qualifications and the challenges of an 
employer-led system', Journal of Education and Work, vol.21(3),pp. 175 — 195. 
 
Lloyd, C. and Payne, J. (2007) ‘Tackling the UK skills problem: can unions make a 
difference?’ in Shelley, S. and Calveley, M. (eds.) Learning with trade unions. A 
contemporary agenda in employment relations. Ashgate, Aldershot. pp. 57-81. 
 
Lucas, N. (2004) The ‘FENTO fandango’: National standards, compulsory teaching 
qualifications and the growing regulation of FE college teachers. Journal of Further 
and Higher Education vol.28(1), pp. 35–51. 
 
Mair, P. (2007) ‘Left-right orientations’ in Dalton, R. J. and Klingemann, H. D. (eds.) 
The Oxford handbook of political behaviour. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Martin, C. J. and Knudsen, J. S. (2007) ‘Scenes from a mall: retail training and the 
future of coordination’ SASE Conference, Copenhagen Business School, June 2007. 
 
McIlroy, J. (2008) ‘Ten years of new labour: workplace learning, social partnership 
and union revitalization in Britain’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol.46(2), pp. 
283-313. 
 
Newman, J. and Clarke, J. (2009) Publics, Politics and Power: Remaking the Public 
in Public Services, London: Sage 
 
Ohmae, K. (2005) The next global stage: challenges and opportunities in our 
borderless world. Prentice Hall. 
 
Olasky, M. (2000) Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is, What It Does, and How 
It Can Transform America. New York: Free Press.  
Payne, J. (2009) ‘Divergent skills policy trajectories in England and Scotland after 
Leitch’ Policy Studies, vol. 30(5), pp. 473-494. 
- (2008) 'Sector skills councils and employer engagement - delivering the 'employer-
led' skills agenda in England', Journal of Education and Work, vol.21(2), pp. 93 — 
113 
 
Pierson, Ch. (1998) ‘The new governance of education: the conservatives and 
education 1988-1997’ Oxford Review of Education, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 131-142. 
 
Pierson, P. (2000) ‘Not just what, but when: timing and sequence in political 
processes’ Studies in American Political Development, vol.14, pp. 72-92. 
-(1996) ‘The New Politics of the Welfare State’ World Politics vol. 48: 143-79. 
 
Power S., Whitty G. (1999) ‘New Labour's education policy: first, second or third 
way?’ Journal of Education Policy, vol. 14, pp. 535-546. 
 
Prabhakar, R. (2002) ‘Capabilities, responsibility, human capital and the third way’ 
The Political Quarterly, vol.73(1), pp. 51-57. 
 
 29 
Ramsden, M, Bennet, R. and Fuller, C. (2004), ‘The Learning and Skills Council and 
the institutional infrastructure for post-16 education and training: an initial 
assessment’ Journal of Education and Work, Vol. 17(4), pp. 397-420. 
 
Robinson, P. (1996) Rhetoric and Reality: Britain’s new vocational qualifications, 
Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics. 
 
Ross, F. (2000) ‘Beyond the Left and Right: The new partisan politics of the welfare 
state’ Governance, vol.13(2), pp.155-183. 
 
Royo, S. (2007) ‘Varieties of capitalism in Spain: Business and the politics of 
coordination’ European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 13(1), pp. 48-65. 
 
Sartori, G. (1970) ‘Concept misformation in comparative politics’ The American 
Political Science Review, vol.64(4), pp. 1033-1053. 
 
Scharpf, F. (2000) ‘The viability of advanced welfare states in the international 
economy: vulnerabilities and questions’ Journal of European Public Policy, vol7(2), 
pp.190-228. 
 
Sending, O. J. and Newmann, I. B. (2006) ‘Governance to governmentality: analyzing 
NGOs, State and Power’ International Studies Quarterly, vol.50, pp. 651-672. 
 
Shelley, S. (2008) ‘Understanding the role of union learning representatives in 
developing distinctive approaches to union learning’ Professional Development in 
Education, vol.34(4), pp. 441-454. 
 
Simmons, R. (2009) ‘The long goodbye: how local authorities lost control of further 
education’ Research in Post-compulsory Education, vol.14(3), pp. 287-297. 
 
Smith, A. and Smith, E. (2007)'The development of key training policies in England 
and Australia: a comparison', London Review of Education, vol.5(1), pp. 51 — 67. 
 
Souto-Otero, M. (2011a) ‘Breaking the consensus in educational policy reform?’ 
Critical Studies in Education, vol.52(1), pp. 77-91.  
-(2011b) ‘Making Higher Education Work: A Comparison of Discourses in the United 
Kingdom’s Conservative and Labour Parties’ General Election Manifestos between 
1979 and 2010’ Comparative Education Review, vol.55(3). 
- (2007) ‘Access to post-compulsory education and training: economic, sociological 
and political determinants and remaining research gaps’ Comparative Education, 
vol.43(4), pp. 571-586. 
 
Stevens, M. (1999) ‘Human Capital theory and UK vocational training policy’ Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, vol. 15(1), pp. 16-32. 
 
Steer, R., Spours, K., Hodgson, A., Finlay, I., Coffield, F., Edward, S. and Gregson, 
M. (2007) ‘Modernisation' and the role of policy levers in the learning and skills 
sector', Journal of Vocational Education & Training, vol. 59(2),pp. 175 — 192.  
 
Swank, D. (2002) Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in 
Developed Welfare States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Taylor, R. (2005) ‘Lifelong Learning and the Labour governments’ Oxford Review of 
Education, vol. 31(1), pp. 101-118 
 
 30 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (ed.) (2004) New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the 
European Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Vind, A., Delamare Le Deist, F., Heidemann, F. and Winterton, J.  (2004) European 
Trade Unions’ strategies on lifelong learning. The Danish Confederation of Trade 
Unions. 
 
Wellis, E., Stuart, M. and Greenwood, I. (2005) ‘Learners of the workplace unite! An 
empirical examination of the UK trade union learning representative initiative’ Work, 
Employment and Society, vol. 19(2), pp. 283-304. 
 
Wood, S. (1999) ‘Education, training and the British third way’ SKOPE Policy Paper 
1; SKOPE, University of Warwick. 
